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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Statutes-Constitutionality of Local Laws
The case of Orange Speedway v. Clayton' held the session law2 which
banned racing in Orange County invalid. The court ruled that this
was a local act regulating trade in violation of the constitution. 3
A case which, although distinguishable, reaches a different outcome is
State v. Chestnutt,4 which involved a broad regulation 5 making Sunday
racing under any circumstances a crime.6 In the Orange Speedway case
the prohibition against promoting Sunday racing was coupled with insurance and permit requirements for weekday racing. Rather than a
prevent labor unions from restricting their membership on the basis of race if they
so desire. However, some states by statute have forbidden all discrimination by

labor unions on the basis of race, including restrictive membership clauses. See,
e.g., NEW YORK CmvuL RIGHTS LAW § 43; NEW YORK ExEcUTIVE LAW § 296(2).
It has been held generally in industrial states that unions which restricted their
membership to persons of a particular race could not enjoy the benefits of a
dosed or union shop contract, the closed shop being inconsonant with the closed
union. See, e.g., the California cases: Thompson v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal. 2d
595, 165 P.2d 901 (1946) ; Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946) ; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721,
155 P.2d 329 (1944) ; Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P2d 343 (1944). Cf.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
In a novel decision the Supreme Court of Kansas held by judicial interpretation
that unions may not restrict their membership on grounds of race or color, if the
union serves as exclusive bargaining agent under a federal statute. In Betts v.
Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946), is found the familiar railway situation
of the Conley case where all employees, both Negro and white, were union members, but where they were segregated into separate locals. Petitioners complained
that their lodge was under the jurisdiction of and represented by the white local
and that plaintiffs could not attend white local meetings, vote on election of officers
or selection of bargaining representatives, nor participate in the determination of
union policy.
Petitioners did not allege that there was a discriminatory collective bargaining
contract or that there had been any attempt on the part of the white local to discriminate in any way, other than their segregation, against Negroes. They simply

complained that they were denied privileges of participation equal to those accorded
to white employees. The court pointed out that in performing its functions ag

statutory bargaining agent, a labor union is not to be regarded as a wholly private
association of individuals free from all constitutional and statutory' restraints to
which public agencies are subjected. They were unimpressed with the argument
that the Negroes, by voluntarily joining the union, had consented to place themselves within the regulations of the union. They held that petitibners' segregation
was arbitrary, fiaught with potential danger to their rights, and a violation'of their
individual rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment in that plaintiffs were deprived
of their liberty and property without due process of law. They pointed out that
a state court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to enforce the Constitution of
the United States.
1247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406 (1958).
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 588.
'N.C.
CoNsT. art. II, § 29 (1917). "The General Assembly shall not pass
any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . regulating labor, trade, mining,
or manufacturing .

...

"

'241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 177.
0241 N.C. at 403, 85 S.E.2d at 299. "The General Assembly, exercising the
police power of the State, may legislate for the protection of the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the people; and Sunday observance statutes
and municipal ordinances derive their validity from this sphere of legislative power."
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sweeping and absolute prohibition of Sunday racing, it was directed
primarily at commercial racing. The court held that such a prohibition
amounts to a regulation of trade.
The court defined "trade" under the constitutional limitation as
"any employment or business engaged in for gain or profit."17 This is
trade in its broadest sense as applied in many tax cases.8 Only two
instances have been found where a local North Carolina act was held to
be a regulation of trade. In both cases there were other reasons for
denying the act's validity,9 and in one case10 the dissent argued for a
more strict interpretation of the words "regulating" and "trade." The
fact that "trade" is used in context with "labor," "mining," and "manufacturing" in the constitutional limitation supports this argument. The
broad definition of "trade" applied by the court would include all these
items. Thus it would seem that "trade" in the amendment was intended
to" be used in the restricted sense, since otherwise there is unnecessary
duplication. A more appropriate definition of "trade" would be "the buying and selling, or exchanging, of commodities either by wholesale or by
retail.""- Under this definition, auto racing and other service industries
would not be included within the prohibition.
-The court's determination that this is a local act is in line with recent
decisions on the subject. However, the judicial history of article II,
section 29 of the constitution indicates a change in thought on the part
of our court. In early decisions, the court seemed eager to support the
constitutionality of questioned legislation, and a finding that an act
12
was unconstitutional came to be the exception rather than the rule.
This resulted from the court's lack of a uniform definition of a local
act and a rather strict interpretation of the subject matter covered by
the prohibition.
IThe first case 1 decided under the amendment held that an act
authorizing the issuance of bonds for road purposes in a township
7247 N.C, at 533, 101 S.E.2d at 410.
'Nesbitt v. Gill, 227 N.C. 174, 41 S.E.2d 646 (1947); Bickett v. State Tax
Comm'n, 177 N.C. 433, 99 S.E. 415 (1919); Smith v. Wilkins, 164 N.C. 136, 80
S.E. 168 (1913); Lenoir Drug Co. v. Town of Lenoir, 160 N.C. 571, 76 S.E.
480 (1912) ; State v. Hunt, 129 N.C. 686, 40 S.E. 216 (1901) ; State v. Worth,
116 N.C. 1007, 21 S.E. 204 (1895).
'Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954)
(act also delegation of legislative power and grant of privilege and immunity) ;
State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939) (act also in conflict with general
licensing power and discrimination within class of real estate brokers).
10 State v. Dixon, 215 N.C. 161, 174, 1 S.E.2d 521, 528 (1939).
'AMzRicAx

COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1283 (1954).

"E.g., Day v. Comm'rs, 191 N.C. 780, 133 S.E. 164 (1926) (act authorizing
bonds and tax for bridge invalid because it specified bridge at designated spot) ;
Armstrong v. Board of Comm'rs, 185 N.C. 405, 117 S.E. 388 (1923) (act authorizing erection of tuberculosis hospital in Gaston County held invalid as local act
relating to health).
"Brown v. Road Comm'rs, 173 N.C. 598, 92 S.E. 502 (1917).
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and the levying of a tax to pay them was not unconstitutional because
it only provided the means for road construction. Such a tax measure
was not an authorization of road work within the meaning of the prohibition. This decision was followed by a series of cases14 concerning
acts authorizing bonds and taxes for roads and bridges in the various
counties. 15 In each of them the court said that the questioned act was
only a tax measure giving the county the means with which to construct,
and was not "authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining,
or discontinuing of highways, streets or alleys . . . [nor] relating to

ferries or bridges"' 16 as prohibited by the amendment. In addition, the
acts were held not to be local because they applied uniformly throughout
the county and the actual construction to be done would be at places
determined at the discretion of the county boards. As late as 1940 the
court held in Fletcher v. Collins17 that an act allowing Buncombe County
to organize any territory in the county into a school district upon
petition by ten per cent of the voters was not a prohibited local act
because the legislature left the determination of where the districts were
to be established to the discretion of the county board.
Within the past decade there has been a new approach by the court
in interpreting the amendment. Acts have been held to be "local" on the
basis of the area to which they applied without regard to the discretion
granted to the county, and the prohibited subject matter has not been
interpreted in such a narrow sense. The first indication of this came
in 1939 in State v. Dixon,'8 which held a real estate tax applicable to
only one third of the counties in the state to be a local law regulating
trade because it was "one operating only in a limited territory or specified locality."' 19 The only reason given for this determination was that
under the theory of In re Harris"° the question of whether a law is local
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. No
attempt was made to distinguish those earlier cases 2 ' which had held
"Road Comm'rs v. Bank, 181 N.C. 347, 107 S.E. 245 (1921); Board of
Comm'rs v. Pruden, 178 N.C. 394, 100 S.E. 695 (1919); Martin County v.
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 178 N.C. 26, 100 S.E. 134 (1919); Parvin v.
Board of Comm'rs, 177 N.C. 508, 99 S.E. 432 (1919) ; Mills v. Board of Comm'rs.
175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481 (1918).
1 The opinion of at least one member of the court as to "the importance of
the decision of the Court in forwarding the good-roads movement of the State"
is illustrated by State v. Kelly, 186 N.C. 365, 376, 119 S.E. 755, 76l (1923).
" N.C. ColsT. art. II, § 29 (1917).
'218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (1940).
18 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939).
20 Id. at 165, 1 S.E.2d at 523.
20 183 N.C.
633, 112 S.E. 425 (1922) (act applicable to 56 of 100 counties held
to be a general law).
21 Fletcher v. Collins, 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E.2d 606 (1940) ; Board of Comm'rs v.
Pruden, 178 N.C. 394, 100 S.E. 695 (1919) ; Parvin v. Board of Comm'rs, 177 N.C.
508, 99 S.E. 432 (1919); Mills v. Board of Comm'rs, 175 N.C. 215, 95 S.E. 481
(1918).
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acts which applied to only one county in the state to be general laws
rather than local ones.
Dixon was followed in 1940 by a decision 22 holding an act setting
up a county pfiysician and quarantine officer in Madison County to be
of a local nature pertaining to health and sanitation and therefore unconstitutional. Within the past eight years, the court has held invalid
acts allowing Winston-Salem and Forsyth County to consolidate their
public health agencies and departments,2 3 prohibiting a county board
of education from expending more than $2,000 for extending water or
sewer sytsems to a new school, 24 allowing construction and operation
of toll roads and bridges in a five county area,2 r and setting up a racing
commission in Morehead City. 26 All of these were found to be invalid
under article 2, section 29 because they were local acts applicable only
in a limited territory and were within the subject matter in which such
local legislation is prohibited. It is interesting to note that the court
relied on these recent decisions to support its position in the present
case even though the amendment has been in effect since 1917. None of
these cases attempts to distinguish the earlier cases with which they
would appear to conflict.
In analyzing the principal case, one arrives at two conclusions. The
first is that Orange County could successfully prevent Sunday racing
by having the legislature pass an act similar to that passed for Wake
County invoking the state police power to enforce such a ban. The
second, and more important conclusion is that the court appears to have
settled upon a more definite interpretation of this amendment. The
cases decided since 1940 have been substantially uniform in holding that
an act is local if it is applicable only to a limited area and the restricted
subject matter has been broadened to include many areas which were
formerly excluded. We can no doubt look forward to more decisions
27
invalidating acts within this area.
LAURENCE A. CoBB

Taxation-Income Tax-Determination of Whether Corporate
Withdrawals Constitute Loans or Dividends
The 1954 Internal Revenue Code defines the term "dividend" as
"any distribution of property made by a corporation to its stockholders
" Sams v. Board of Comm'rs, 217 N.C. 284, 7 S.E.2d 540 (1940).
2"Idol

S.E.2d377,31370(1951).
Lambv.v.Street,
Board233of N.C.
Educ.,730,23565 N.C.
S.E.2d 201 (1952).
"5Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310
(1953).
"Taylor v. Carolina Racing Ass'n, Inc., 241 N.C. 80, 84 S.E.2d 390 (1954).

" For a detailed discussion of the problem of local, private, and special legislation, see Report of the Commissiom on Public-Local and Private Legislation,
Popular Government, Feb.-March, 1949.

